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go against the tortfeasor 5 But in this case the insurer's subroga-
tion rights were not destroyed, making it doubtful that such a re-
imbursement possibility is open. Moreover, the insurer has not
chosen to proceed for reimbursement but has brought an action
against the defendant. The question then becomes whether, if reim-
bursement is possible, the defendant can have the insured joined as
a party. While there are some possible analogous decisions,2" they
are not really very closely related and the prospect seems doubtful.
Unless it was fairly evident that damages were going to run to
a significantly larger figure, the defendant, who paid for a settle-
ment with the insured and still faces a subrogation action by the
insurer, has made a rather bad bargain. The danger of such a bar-
gain could be avoided, and just settlement encouraged, if procedural
devices were available to require that all parties needed for final and
complete settlement could be joined in the suit.
ROBERT L. THOMPSON
Jury--Allowing Challenge for Cause to a Prospective Juror
Opposed to Capital Punishment
In State v. Childs1 defendant was found guilty of rape and
burglary in the first degree and sentenced to death. Appeal was
made on the ground inter alia that the trial judge erred in granting
the State's challenges for cause to prospective jurors on the ground
that they had conscientious scruples against the infliction of the
' See cases collected in 29A Am. JUR. INSURANCE § 1736 (1960).
"One sued by subrogated insurer for having destroyed the property
may require all other insurance companies participating in paying the loss
to be made parties to the action. Powell & Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171
N.C. 290, 88 S.E. 426 (1916). While a fire insurance company, which pays
a loss, is proportionately subrogated to the insurer's right of action against
the tortfeasor, the insurer must work out his remedy through the insured,
so, where several insurance companies each paid part of a loss, it was proper,
where separate actions by the several insurance companies were consolidated,
to make the insured a party. Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southern R.R.,
179 N.C. 255, 102 S.E. 417 (1920). See United States v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949) where the Court held that where an insurer
has become partially subrogated to the rights of an insured under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act, both are "necessary parties" but not "indispensible
parties" and either party may sue, although in such case the United States
upon timely motion may compel their joinder.
1269 N.C. 307, 152 S.E.2d 453 (1967).
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death penalty. The North Carolina Supreme Court found no error.
It said:
It is a general rule that the State in the trial of crimes punishable
by death has the right to an impartial jury, and in order to secure
it, has the right to challenge for cause any prospective juror who
is shown to entertain beliefs regarding capital punishment which
would be calculated to prevent him from joining in any verdict
carrying the death penalty.
2
The practice of excusing, on a challenge for cause, any pro-
spective juror who is opposed to capital punishment is followed in
the federal courts' and in the majority of state courts by either
statute4 or judicial decision.5 This practice originated at a time
when conviction of a capital crime meant a compulsory death sen-
tence,' and the theory behind the practice is obvious. In a case
where a finding of guilty would automatically mean the death penal-
ty, a juror opposed to capital punishment would never vote in favor
of the defendant's guilt, thus prejudicing the prosecution.
Today most states, including North Carolina, have abolished the
mandatory death penalty.' Statutes in those states now give the jury
discretion as to the punishment to be imposed.' Under such statutes
the jury first decides whether the defendant is guilty or innocent of
2 Id. at 317-18, 152 S.E.2d at 461.
'Turberville v. United States, 303 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. de-
nied, 370 U.S. 946 (1962).
' E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1074: "A challenge for implied bias may be
taken for all or any of the following causes and no other... 8. If the offense
charged by punishable with death, the entertaining of such conscientious
opinions as would preclude his finding the defendant guilty; in which case
he must neither be permitted nor compelled to serve as a juror."
State v. Childs, 269 N.C. 307, 152 S.E.2d 453 (1967). See Annot., 48
A.L.R.2d 560 (1956).
'E.g., State v. Vann, 162 N.C. 534, 77 S.E. 295 (1913).
"See Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U.
PA. L. Rxv. 1099 (1953).
8 In North Carolina the death penalty may be imposed for murder in
the first degree, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953); rape, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-21 (1953); burglary in the first degree, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-52
(1953); and arson, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-58 (1953). In each of these
statutes is the following provision: "Provided, if at the time of rendering
its verdict [of guilty of a capital crime] in open court, the jury shall so
recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life in the State's pri-
son, and the court shall so instruct the jury." This provision gives the
jury "an unbridled discretionary right" to recommend that punishment for
the crime shall be imprisonment for life in lieu of death in all cases where
a verdict of guilty of a capital crime has been reached. State v. McMillan,
233 N.C. 630, 633, 65 S.E.2d 212, 213 (1951).
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the crime charged. If guilty, the jury then decides what the punish-
ment shall be-the death penalty or life imprisonment. Since the
death penalty is no longer automatically imposed by the jury upon a
finding of guilty, can it still be said that a juror opposed to capital
punishment may be prevented by that opposition from joining a
verdict of guilty? The courts of two states have said not.
In State v. Lee9 the Iowa Supreme Court held it error to allow
a challenge for cause to a prospective juror who was opposed to
capital junishment. The court said:
It cannot be said that the state is entitled to have the punishment
by death inflicted in any case. The statute authorizes that pun-
ishment, in the discretion of the jury, . . . but the state has no
right to a trial by jurors who have no objection against inflicting
the death penalty, except as it can secure them by challenging
peremptorially those who have such objections.'
In State v. Garrington" the South Dakota Supreme Court, in up-
holding the trial judge's refusal to allow challenge for cause on these
grounds, agreed that under a statute mandatorially imposing the
death penalty upon a finding of guilty, a juror opposed to capital
punishment would not find the defendant guilty. But where the jury
has discretion as to punishment "the entertaining of such opinions
does not have that effect, and is not a cause for challenge."' 2
There is a further challenging theory supporting the proposition
that persons opposed to capital punishment should not be excluded
from juries in capital cases. Basically it is that a jury from which
such persons have been excluded "will necessarily have been culled
of the most humane of its prospective members"' 3 and will contain
members who, consciously or unconsciously, will be more prone to
convict, and tend to find a particular defendant guilty on less evi-
dence than would a jury from which persons opposed to capital
punishment were not excluded.' 4 Professor Walter E. Oberer 5
proposes the argument thusly:
'91 Iowa 499, 60 N.W. 119 (1894).
"Id. at 502, 60 N.W. at 121.
' 11 S.D. 178, 76 N.W. 326 (1898).
1 Id. at 184, 76 N.W. at 327.
Oberer, Does Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital
Punishinent Constitute Denial of Fair Trial Ot Issue of Guilt?, 39 TEXAS
L. REV. 545, 549 (1961). [Hereinafter cited as Oberer]
" This theory is pointedly supported in AnoRNo, FRENKEL-BRUNSWIK,
LEVINSON, & SANFORD, THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY (1950). [Here-
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(1) Under modern statutes the guilt issue has been separated
from the punishment issue. (2) The necessity which justified
death-qualification under the old mandatory, one-issue statutes no
longer obtains. (3) A jury qualified to the prosecution's satis-
faction on the punishment issue is correspondingly disqualified
from the defendant's standpoint on the guilt issue. (4) The logi-
cal consequence is that when the same jury decides both issues,
the defendant is denied due process of law through having forced
upon him a partial jury on the most critical issue in the case--
that of guilt or innocence.1 6
Persons opposed to capital punishment form a sizeable and defi-
nite class in our society, and those in favor of capital punishment
are actually in a minority.17 Of the people in favor of capital punish-
ment, many do not like the idea of having anything to do with it
themselves."8 Can it be said then that a jury composed of such a
class of persons, who are in a minority in our society and who may
tend to more quickly find a criminal defendant guilty on less evi-
inafter cited as ADoIxo]. This book, a study on prejudice, includes data
indicating that there are persons possessing certain personality traits in
varying degrees. Among these traits are certain attitudes toward people.
On one end of the scale are persons with attitudes such as moralistic con-
demnation of other people, the tendency to blame other people rather than
oneself, general suspiciousness and distrust of others, orientation towards
persons in positions of power and authority, and an exploitive-manipulative-
opportunistic attitude. The persons on this end of the scale will externalize
and project their hostile feelings by conceiving of others as threatening and
dangerous. On the other end of the scale are persons who feel permissive
toward other people, who tend to refrain from blaming others, who feel
trustingness and openess and see people as essentially "good" until proved
otherwise, who conceive of the environment as congenial rather than dan-
gerous, and who tend persistently to strive for realization of productive
social values. Between these two extremes lie the greater percentage of
people possessing these traits in different degrees. Id. at 405-15.
See also WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH (1956).
In Turberville v. United States, 303 F.2d 411, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 946 (1962), the court noted that there was a "thesis
in this area of the law . . . that persons who are not opposed to capital
punishment are psychologically inclined against criminals and therefore a
jury composed of such persons is not an impartial jury." This thesis was
rejected by the court without extensive consideration.
" See note 13 mipra.
" Oberer 555.
" A recent poll indicated that forty-three percent of the people in the
United States are opposed to capital punishment for persons convicted of
murder; this figure rose from twenty-five per cent in 1953. Twelve per
cent of the people have no opinion. This left forty-five per cent in favor of
capital punishment for persons convicted of murder. Press release by the
Gallup Institute dated February 5, 1965 on file in Wilson Library at Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
2
18 WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNIsH, 168 (1956).
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dence, does not deprive that defendant of due process of law? In
two recent cases attention has been focused on the constitutional
aspects of the problems of exclusion from juries of members of
definite and sizeable classes in society.
In Labat v. Bennett"9 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit held inter alia that systematic total exclusion of daily wage
earners as a class violated the criminal defendant's due process and
equal protection rights to an impartial jury representing a cross-
section of the community. °
In a different context is Schowgurow v. State."' There the
Maryland Court of Appeals held that the provisions "of the Mary-
land Constitution requiring demonstrations of belief in God as a
qualification for service as a grand or petit juror are in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and that any requirement of an oath
as to such belief, or inquiry of prospective jurors, oral or written,
as to whether they believe in a Supreme Being is unconstitution-
al.",
22
These cases indicate that when a state systematically and totally
excludes from the jury a sizeable and clearly defined class of per-
sons, such as those opposed to capital punishment, a criminal defen-
dant is denied a jury drawn from a cross-section of society and
his constitutional rights have thus been invaded.
" 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966), petition for cert. denied, 35 U.S.L. WEEK
3272 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1967) (No. 956)." In Labat the court relied upon the words of the United States Supreme
Court in Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946); Glasser v.
United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); and Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1940). The court in Smith said, "It is part of the established tradition in
the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly
representative of the community." 311 U.S. at 130. In Glasser it was pointed
out that "the proper functioning of the jury system, and, indeed our de-
mocracy itself, requires that the jury be a 'body truly representative of the
community,' and not the organ of any special group or class." 315 U.S. at
86.
In Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), the Court rejected a con-
stitutional challenge to purported exclusion from juries, by the state of New
York, of working class people in order to form a "blue-ribbon" jury. How-
ever, it should be noted that the Court accepted the proposition that a jury
should represent a cross-section of the community, and based its opinion
heavily upon the lack of evidence that any "person was excluded because
of his occupation or economic status." Id. at 291. Further, in Theil the
Court stated that exclusion of daily wage earners "cannot be justified by
federal or state law," although it rested its decision that daily wage earners
cannot be excluded from federal juries upon its supervisory powers. 328
U.S. at 222.
21 240 Md. 121, 213 A.2d 475 (1965).
"Id. at 131, 213 A.2d at 482.
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A questionable point in the argument against excluding those
opposed to capital punishment is that if the jurisdiction requires
that the jury be unanimous in its decision on punishment, whether
it be death or life imprisonment, as well as guilt, then one juror
opposed to capital punishment could prevent a unanimous vote for
the death penalty. Among the states that have considered the partic-
ular question, there is a split of authority.23 Some states require
unanimity on both guilt and punishment." Others hold that if the
verdict is guilty of the capital crime and the jury does not vote
unanimously to recommend life imprisonment, the death penalty
will automatically be imposed; so there does not have to be a un-
animous vote in order to impose the death penalty.2 5
No case has been found in which the North Carolina Supreme
Court has been faced with this question. The North Carolina
statutes provide that certain crimes "shall be punished with death:
Provided, if at the time of rendering its verdict in open court, the
jury shall so recommend, the punishment shall be imprisonment for
life .... 26 From this wording it would appear that if the jury did
not unanimously so recommend, the death penalty would be im-
posed. If this interpretation were placed upon the statute by the
court, then some jury members opposed to capital punishment could
not prevent imposition of the death penalty. If the position taken
was that the jury must be unanimous as to which penalty is to be
imposed, then one juror could prevent the death penalty from being
imposed. However, it is suggested that in this situation it should
be possible to have a bifurcated trial. In the first stage, a jury from
which no one opposed to capital punishment was excluded would
consider the defendant's guilt or innocence. If the defendant is
found guilty, the trial would move into the second stage with a
jury from which everyone opposed to capital punishment was ex-
cluded. This jury would consider the punishment to be imposed.
Admittedly, this process would require more time and be more ex-
pensive to the state. However in this way the defendant's interest in
2 3Amnot., 1 A.L.R.3d 1461 (1965); Annot., 92 L. Ed. 2d 1072 (1948);
Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L.
Rnv. 1099, 1125 (1953).
" E.g., State v. Reynolds, 41 N.J. 163, 195 A.2d 449 (1963), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 1000 (1964)."5E.g., Commonwealth v. McNeil, 328 Mass. 436, 104 N.E.2d 153 (1952).
"6 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-17, 21, 52, 58 (1953).
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an impartial jury on the question of his guilt, as well as the prose-
cution's interest in an impartial jury on the question of punishment,
would be protected. Certainly the desire to see that a criminal de-
fendant, who may lose his life, gets a decision as to his guilt by a
fair and impartial jury outweighs considerations of the time and
cost of this procedure.17
The courts and legislatures must face the realization that exclu-
sion from the jury of persons opposed to capital punishment con-
tinues as a vestige of an ancient rule of law that had its origin
under the now non-existant mandatory death penalty statutes. They
should be made aware of the psychological data indicating that a jury
from which this large segment of society has been excluded may
result in prejudice to the defendant on the question of his guilt.
Decisions must be made on whether the present practice is to con-
tinue, and, if so, what interest society has in its continuation. Hope-
fully, the constitutional implications of this practice will lead to
judicial decisions or legislation to the effect that these persons should
no longer be excluded from the jury in capital cases. If the present
27 The necessity of bifurcated trials has been recognized by other courts.
In Holmes v. United States, 363 F.2d 281 (D.C. Cir. 1966) the court noted
the prejudicial effect of pleading the defense of insanity and the defense of
not guilty before the same jury and stated that the trial judge could impanel
a second jury to hear evidence on the insanity issue, after the first jury
had considered the issue of guilt, "if this appears necessary to eliminate
prejudice." Id. at 283.
Another example is the situation in which the jury determines the volun-
tariness of a criminal defendant's confession, and then, upon a finding that
it was involuntary and excludable, proceeds to determine the defendant's
guilt. The United States Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno, 278 U.S.
368 (1964) found this practice unconstitutional and held that the same jury
should not decide both issues.
Examples of statutory provisions for bifurcated trials can be seen in
California, CAL. PEN. CODE § 190.1, and in New York, N.Y. PEN. LAw
§ 1045-a. Under these statutes the trial court may for good cause discharge
the jury that decided the guilt question in a capital case, and impanel a new
one to decide the question of punishment; other wise the same jury will
decide both issues. It should be noted that the Supreme Court of California
recently rejected, with little discussion, the contention of a criminal defen-
dant that since the trial court could discharge the jury deciding the guilt
issue in a capital case, there was no reason for the judge to sustain chal-
lenges for cause to prospective jurors who indicated that they could not
vote for the death penalty. The court read into the statute a "legislative
directive" that "whenever possible the same jury shall serve at both phases
of the trial by reasons of continuity and economy of effort." People v.
Smith, 63 C.2d 779, -, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382, 389, 409 P.2d 222, 229 (1966).
For a discussion of the right to a bifurcated trial in general, see 45
N.C.L. REv. 541 (1967).
DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
practice continues the bifurcated trial process could be utilized to
avoid the unfairness of the present situation.
PENDER R. MCELROY
Labor Law-Breach of the Duty of Fair Representation
as an Unfair Labor Practice
Since 1962 the National Labor Relations Board has held that
the failure of a union to represent its members fairly is an unfair
labor practice.' The NLRB has used Sections 8(b) (A),2 8(b)2 3
and 8(b) 34 of the National Labor Relations Act to reach this result.
'Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). See e.g., Local 12, United Rubber Workers, 150
N.L.R.B. 312 (1964); Automobile Workers Union, 149 N.L.R.B. 482
(1964); Local 1367, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, 148 N.L.R.B. 897 (1964);
Independent Metal Workers Union, 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964).
'Section 8(b) 1 provides in part that it shall be an unfair labor practice
for a union or its agents "to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the ex-
ercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph
shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules
with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein. .. "
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat. 140 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (1964).
Section 7 provides "Employees shall have the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities. . . ." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
' Section 8(b)2 provides in part that it shall be an unfair labor practice
for a union or its agents "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to dis-
criminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to dis-
criminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such
organization has been denied or terminated on some ground other than his
failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required
as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. . . .' 61 Stat. 141
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2) (1964).
Section 8(a)3 provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or
any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage member-
ship in any labor organization ... " 61 Stat 140 (1957), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1964).
'Section 8(b)3 provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a
union or its agents "to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer,
provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the provisions
ship in any labor organization. . . ." 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b) (3) (1964).
Section 8(d) provides in part "to bargain collectively is the performance
of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the em-
19671 1077
